Silly Questions and Arguments for the Implicit, Cinematic Narrator by Curran, Angela
Metadata of the chapter that will be visualized online
Chapter Title Silly Questions and Arguments for the Implicit, Cinematic Narrator
Copyright Year 2019
Copyright Holder The Author(s)





Organization/University Kansas State University
Address Manhattan, KS, USA
Abstract This chapter aims to advance the debate on a problem often raised by 
philosophers of film who are skeptical of implied narrators in movies. This is 
the concern that positing such implied narrators leads to absurd imaginings. 
Indeed, the debate over the cinematic narrator has been at a stalemate most 
centrally because there seems to be no resolution as to whether it is or is not 
legitimate to “fill in” the implications of the implied narrator’s presence in the 
story world. I examine how the “absurd imaginings” problem arises for all 
the central arguments for the elusive cinematic narrator and discuss why it is 
legitimate to fill in the implications of the implied narrator’s presence in the 
world of the fiction film.
Keywords (separated 
by “ - ”)
Cinematic narration - Implied narrator - Absurd imaginings - Fiction
© The Author(s) 2019
N. Carroll et al. (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of the Philosophy of Film 
and Motion Pictures, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19601-1_5
CHAPTER 5




Fiction films tell a story, with images and sound, and in doing so invite the 
audience to imagine that specific events have happened, as they are reported 
and shown in the image and soundtrack of the movie (Carroll 1990, 1996, 
2006; Currie 1990; Walton 1990: 39; Lamarque and Olsen 1994).1 But how 
more precisely does movie narration work on the viewer so that she compre-
hends the story? Here there is a tremendous and fascinating debate regarding 
the nature of cinematic narration, or how a movie conveys the story events to 
the audience.
This chapter concerns these disagreements. The focus is on the view that 
there are ubiquitous, implicit narrators in fiction films. Such a narrator is the 
agent that is tacitly understood to be carrying out a showing of the story events 
to the audience from the world of the film fiction. My chapter aims to advance 
the debate on a problem often raised by philosophers who are skeptical of 
implied narrators in movies. This is the concern that positing such elusive nar-
rators gives rise to absurd imaginings (Gaut 2004: 242; Carroll 2006: 179–180, 
2016). The worry arises because critics maintain that the “Realistic Heuristic” 
governs our imaginings about fiction. The Realistic Heuristic involves the 
claim that when we engage with a work of fiction, we “fill in” and draw 
1 For an influential discussion of make-believe and the mimetic arts, see Kendall Walton (1990). 
For recent discussions of fiction and imagination, see Matravers (2014) and Stock (2017). For an 
accessible overview of some key debates about fiction and imagination, see Stock (2013).
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 implications from what is explicitly true in the fiction based on how things 
work in real life, unless it is explicitly stipulated to be otherwise. The problem, 
critics allege, is that when we “fill in” the implications of the implied cinematic 
narrator’s presence in the story world, absurd imaginings follow. For instance, 
how is it possible for an implied narrator to convey the story of the Battle of 
Dunkirk from the scene of the action without getting shot or having to duck 
bullets? George Wilson, a supporter of some kind of implicit, “narrating 
agency” in fiction films, maintains that the indeterminate nature of what is true 
in the story world means that questions about how the implied narrating 
agency is able to carry out its mission are “silly” ones to ask (Wilson 2011, 2013).
The debate between friends and foes of the cinematic narrator has been at a 
stalemate most centrally because there seems to be no resolution as to whether 
the questions critics raise about the implied narrator in movies are legitimate 
ones to ask. In this chapter, I examine how the “absurd imaginings” problem 
arises for all the central arguments for the elusive cinematic narrator and discuss 
why the questions critics pose about this narrator are legitimate ones to ask.
In Part I, I introduce some terminology relevant to understanding the 
debate about cinematic narrators. In Parts II, III, and IV, three central argu-
ments—The Narration Implies a Narrator Argument, The Ontological Gap 
Argument, and the Imagined Seeing Thesis—are considered and assessed. In 
Part V, we focus on the arguments for and against the claim that positing the 
implied narrator in movies gives rise to absurd imaginings.
In my concluding comments, I briefly discuss directions of research that 
further inquires into cinematic narration might take.
Part I: Narration and Narrators
We should clarify some terminology. Fiction films convey a story, which is 
about something, what we call its fictional content. The story is concerned 
with giving an account of imagined characters and situations. A film has a plot, 
an underlying sequence of events as they occur in the story, and narration, the 
telling or relating of these fictional events to the audience.2 Cinematic narra-
tion is the way in which the film tells a story.3
Some of the ways in which we talk about narration in cinema has its origins 
in literary theory.4 Someone creates or makes a work of literary fiction: this is 
the actual flesh-and-blood author. The author is something external to the 
film, its cause or creator. So, for example, Conan Doyle is the author of the 
Sherlock Holmes stories. An author also sometimes creates a narrator, an 
internal component of the work that is the fictional voice that recounts the 
2 See Wilson 2003 and Livingston 2005 for a survey of some of the points in contention about 
narrative, in general. For skepticism about the usefulness of talking about cinematic narration, see 
Pye (2013: 136).
3 For an introduction to the basic principles of cinematic narration, see Bordwell (1985: 48–61) 
and Carroll (2008: 116–146).







































happenings and situations that take place in the story. For example, in the 
Sherlock Holmes stories, it is Sherlock’s trusty sidekick, Doctor Watson, who 
is a character in and the narrator of the Holmes stories.
Similarly, someone creates a film: this is the flesh-and-blood filmmaker, the 
actual person who is the cause or creator of a film. Where it is reasonable to 
think that one individual exercises the most significant control over the movie, 
we can speak of the filmmaker as the counterpart of the author (Livingston 
1997). Alternatively, when it makes sense to think of the movie as the creative 
product of a group of individuals, such as the director, the screenwriter, the 
cinematographer, and so on, we can say the movie is the collaborative project 
of multiple filmmakers (Gaut 2010: 128–132).
When literary theorists talk about how works of fiction convey points of 
view on the events in the story, they often use the concept of the “implied 
author.” This is a hypothetical construct whose viewpoint on what happens in 
the story world makes itself clear in the text (Booth 1961: 70–71; Nehamas 
1981). Likewise, some use the term “implied filmmaker” for the hypothetical 
agent who is responsible for the sensibility and attitudes manifest in the film’s 
narration.5
We said that a narrator is a fictional character that recounts the goings on in 
the story. Some novels have explicit character-narrators, such as Doctor Watson 
in the Sherlock Holmes novels or the character of Esch, who tells her story in 
the first-person in Jesmyn Ward’s Salvage the Bones. In these novels, it is fic-
tional that the characters are telling the story. However, some hold that in 
every literary fiction, there are implicit narrators—fictional beings who recount 
the story events as real to the reader. These narrators are implicit, not explicitly 
introduced, and they have no interaction with the other fictional characters in 
the story. The actual author cannot tell the story because she does not believe 
the events in her story happened. Instead, there must be a narrator who is part 
of the story world and who believes the characters and events exist and reports 
them as fact to the reader.
The debate over cinematic narration concerns whether we should make the 
same move and say that there are implicit narrators in movies by whose actions 
we come to know about the depicted events in the world of the film. One cen-
tral point of contention is whether the same reasons that some say there are 
implicit narrators in literary fictions carry over to support the claim that movies 
standardly have implicit narrators as well.
A second is how best to describe the specific imaginative experience of the 
audience who watches a movie. We can understand this point of contention as 
a question about what the audience at the movies is “mandated” to imagine. 
5 See Wilson’s discussion of the implied filmmaker of Letter from an Unknown Woman (1948) in 
Wilson (1986: 134–9). Some, such as David Bordwell, reject the notion of an “implied filmmaker” 
and, instead, prefers to talk about how the “narration itself” cues the viewer to be surprised, sym-
pathetic, and so on (Bordwell 1985: 62). Greg Currie (1995a, b) uses the concept of an “implied 
filmmaker” to address unreliable narration in fiction films.








































The idea is that a fiction film “mandates” or requires that the viewer imagine 
various things as part of their correct comprehension and appreciation of the 
movie’s narrative. The second point of contention is then: are viewers at the 
movies “mandated” to imagine just the fictional contents of the story? 
Alternatively, are they also required to imagine how it is that they come to learn 
of the story events? If so, is it standard for viewers to learn about the world of 
the story through an implicit, fictional narrator? If the answer to this last ques-
tion is “yes,” then we say that the implicit narrator “mediates” our access to the 
story events and the narrator presents those events to us “indirectly” (Walton 
1990: 357).
Now, to illustrate, some fiction films mediate our access to the story by 
using characters from the story that the film explicitly introduces as the tellers 
of the tale, as happens in Shawshank Redemption (Drabont, 1994) or Murder 
My Sweet (Dmytryk, 1944). Films also tell the story by using omniscient narra-
tors such as the voice-over narrator in The Royal Tenenbaums (Anderson, 
2001). In this case, the narrator belongs to the fictional world and reports the 
events as if they happened, but is not involved in any of the story events.
But what does the audience imagine when they watch a fiction film where 
the story is not told either by a character-narrator or by an omniscient, third- 
person narrator, as is the case with The Wizard of Oz? Some claim that every 
fiction film has an implicit, fictional narrator who is responsible for conveying 
the story, as a whole, to the audience. Call this the “Ubiquity Thesis” (see 
Kania 2005: 47). We now turn to examine arguments for this thesis.
Part II: Narration Implies a Narrator
 Chatman’s Argument
Why should we think that there are ubiquitous fictional narrators in movies? 
Seymour Chatman has argued for the implied cinematic narrator, simply by 
considering what is implicit in the concept of narration (Chatman 1990: 128; 
see also Levinson 1996: 252). Thus, Chatman’s argument is known as the 
Analytic or A Priori Argument.6 His argument is that the meaning of the con-
cept of “narration” logically implies there must be a narrator.
The Narration Implies a Narrator Argument:
Stage One (Chatman 1990: 113–15)
 1. Every narrative is an activity, the act of telling or showing a story.
 2. Activities must have agents.
 3. The agent of a narration is its narrator.
 4. Therefore, necessarily, for every act of storytelling, there is a narrator.








































Stage Two (Chatman 1990: 133–4)
 5. Fictional films contain narratives.
 6. Therefore, necessarily, for every fiction film there is a fictional narrator.
Chatman responds to David Bordwell, who proposes that narration is a process 
or activity of selecting, arranging, and rendering story material (Bordwell 
1985: xi). Chatman counters by saying that activities require agents; there is no 
doing without a doer (Stage One above). In the case of cinematic narration, 
the agent carries out the showing of the story to the audience. The narrator is 
not an actual human being (see Stage Two above), so this means the narrator 
cannot be the actual filmmaker who creates the film.
Also, Chatman argues the narrator cannot be the implied filmmaker. 
Narration, the act of telling a story, involves communication between a sender 
and a receiver, whereas the implied filmmaker (hypothetically) invents the nar-
rative, but does not communicate it to the audience, says Chatman (1990: 
130). Narration implies someone or something that narrates: therefore, in lit-
erary works and fiction films, there is a narrator, distinct from the actual film-
maker, who uses the soundtrack and the series of edited photographic images 
to convey the story.
 Questions About Chatman’s Argument
Some question the claim that narration logically implies a narrator. For exam-
ple, David Bordwell’s view is that every property attributed to a narrating agent 
can instead be ascribed to the film’s “narration itself” (Bordwell 1985: xi). 
Critics say in reply that this involves an inappropriate personification of the 
filming process, or it is a shorthand device for saying there is a narrating agency 
doing the narration, which does not get rid of an intentional agency doing the 
storytelling (Gaut 2010: 200; see also Currie 1995a, b: 247–9).7 So many are 
inclined to accept that narration implies a narrator.
The central problem with Chatman’s argument is that it fails to establish 
that narration requires a fictional narrator. For even if we restrict the argument 
to fictional narratives, and we suppose that the claim that (a) there is a telling 
or narration of a fictional story, entails the claim that (b) there is someone who 
tells the story, it does not follow without some further argument that (c) there 
is fictional narrator or teller of the story. For it could be the author who is the 
one who tells the story.8
7 For the same reason, some who accept the idea that storytelling or narration is an intentional 
activity reject Kendall Walton’s suggestion that there could be a “naturally occurring” and non-
intentionally produced story, for instance, cracks in wood that seem to tell a story, provided the 
audience standardly decided to use such things as “props” in their game of make-believe (Walton 
1990: 52).







































Indeed, some maintain that given that narratives are artifacts that are made 
to communicate a story, the clear choice for the person who tells the story is 
the actual author or filmmaker. For the narrator is the person whose intentions 
have to be understood if the story is to be correctly appreciated and that would 
be the actual person who created the story (Currie 2010: 66). If this line of 
criticism is successful, the intentional nature of a film, as a work designed to 
communicate a story, leads back to the actual author as the storyteller, not 
toward an implied cinematic narrator. And the attempt to say that logic requires 
there are implicit fictional narrators in every film fails.
Finally, when we think of explicit narrators, we normally suppose it is appro-
priate to ask things such as, how does the narrator know about these things? 
And, what is its point of view? (Currie 2010: 66). But there are no answers to 
these questions about an implicit narrator, who is not explicitly introduced as 
the agent giving us access to the story. Chatman tries to maintain that ques-
tions about how the narrator works are “non-questions” not in need of an 
answer (Chatman 1990: 130). But as we will see, such queries about the 
implicit narrator are not disposed of so easily.
Part III: The Ontological Gap Argument
 Can the Actual Filmmaker Tell Her Fictional Story?
The argument we will discuss in this section aims to make up for the deficits in 
Chatman’s argument. It does not try to reason, a priori, from the concept of 
narration to the existence of a fictional narrator. Rather, the argument is that 
implicit cinematic narrators are needed to explain the nature of our engage-
ment with fiction films. The argument, presented by Jerrold Levinson in a rich 
discussion of film music and narrative agency (and recently defended in Wilson 
2011 and Matravers 2014), has come to be known as the “Ontological Gap 
Argument.”9
Ontological Gap Argument:
 1. Reason demands an answer to the question of what makes possible our 
knowledge of the story events.
 2. Only fictional beings can have access to events in the world of the fiction.
 3. Therefore, only a fictional narrator can convey to us the knowledge of 
the events in the world of the fiction.
 4. We do have knowledge of the story events in film fiction.
 5. Therefore, there is a fictional being, an implicit, cinematic narrator who 
is responsible for conveying the knowledge of the events in the story.10
9 See Levinson (1996: 252–256); so-named by Andrew Kania in (2005).
10 Levinson describes the cinematic narrator as an agent who provides access to the story world. 






































Note that the conclusion of the argument, (5) above, applies to all fictional 
movies. Thus, if the Ontological Gap Argument is correct, the Ubiquity Thesis 
is established. Implicit fictional narrators are ubiquitous; they are standard in all 
fiction films. Such implied narrators are “the best default assumption available 
for how we make sense of narrative fiction film” (Levinson 1996: 252).
But does the argument stand up? If this is the correct way to formulate 
Levinson’s argument, then several problems arise.
One worry is that the argument is undermined by its assumptions (Kania 
2005: 48–49). Premise (2) says that only fictional beings can have access to the 
world of fiction. But the cinematic narrator, Levinson supposes, is part of the 
story world. It follows that the audience cannot have access to the fictional nar-
rator and its fictional narration since this occurs in the world of the story. So 
implied fictional narrators do not help with the worry about how we “access” 
the story world. Also, Noël Carroll raises a Platonic Third-Man style objection. 
The Ontological Gap Argument maintains that we need a fictional being to 
access items in the fiction. Since the cinematic narrator is part of the story 
world (even if it does not interact with the other denizens in the world), then 
we are off on an infinite regress, and we will need another cinematic narrator 
to access the first cinematic narrator, and so on! (Carroll 2006: 179).
Another point of contention is the claim that only a fictional being can show 
the story events to the audience (premise 3). It follows that the actual or 
implied filmmaker cannot show or narrate the goings on in the story. The film-
maker, either actual or implied, can show us images, for instance, shots of the 
sets on the lot of Universal Studio, which are filmed to represent Frankenstein’s 
castle. However, the filmmaker cannot show the audience the fictional goings 
on in Frankenstein’s castle, for they stand apart from it, in the outside (actual) 
world (Carroll 2016: 117).
Carroll challenges the Ontological Gap Argument by testing our intuitions 
about scenes in which movie directors appear as themselves, a not uncommon 
practice in cinema (Carroll 2016: 121). Carroll discusses the case of Bergman’s 
Persona (1966), where toward the end, we see documentary-style scenes of 
Bergman and the camera crew (Carroll 2016: 121). What are we supposed is 
going on in this scene? It is natural to suppose that the filmmaker, Bergman, is 
appearing in the story, not some fictional stand-in. For, if contrary to fact, 
Bergman was to have a heart attack in the scene, who would we say died? 
Carroll maintains that our intuition tells us that it would be the actual director, 
Bergman, not some fictional doppelganger, Carroll maintains. These and simi-
lar examples (for instance, Hitchcock making a cameo appearance in his films) 
give us reason to question the sharp dichotomy between the fictional world 
and the actual filmmaker on which the Ontological Gap Argument rests.
also responsible for crafting the plot, the underlying sequences of events in the story (see Levinson 
1996: 280, footnote 21).









































 Defending the Ontological Gap Argument
In reply, Levinson is likely to say the above formulation of his argument misses 
his central point. Viewers at the movies imagine that they are receiving visual 
information from the story world. The actual filmmaker cannot convey visual 
information from the fictional world. Only a narrator operating from within 
the world of the fiction, for whom the events are “real and reportable” can give 
the viewer the sort of perceptual access that she imagines herself to have 
(Levinson 1996: 255). Indeed, Derek Matravers recently argues that Levinson’s 
point involves the “standard view” that to “imagine a story” involves some-
thing like, “to imagine it is a report of actual events” (Matravers 2014: 123).
However, it is far from clear that this is the consensus view on what is 
involved when viewers imagine a story, by either reading a literary fiction or 
watching a fiction film. Critics insist that an important point is being begged in 
describing what the viewer imagines that she is seeing is a “report” of events, if 
this is taken to imply the viewer imagines she is seeing a visual recounting of 
actual events (Carroll 2016: 126). Instead, other explanations of how a movie 
works on the viewer so she understands what is going on or true in the story 
are available.
Noël Carroll proposes the view, for example, that what is so in fiction is 
whatever the maker or makers of the fiction intended the audience to imagine 
(Carroll 2016: 122). Call this the Imagination Account of Fiction. If the actual 
filmmakers of An American Werewolf in London (John Landis, 1981), for 
example, mandate that the audience imagines that American college student, 
David Kessler, is bitten by a werewolf and turns into one, then it is true in the 
fiction that this is so. If Carroll is right, there is no need to posit a fictional nar-
rator, reporting the story events as if they are real, to explain how a viewer 
understands what goes on in the story. Narrative comprehension comes about 
through the “fictive intent” of the work’s creator (Carroll 2006: 176).
Derek Matravers, however, insists that the Imagination Account of Fiction 
is mistaken (Matravers 2010: Chapters 3 and 7). He firmly rejects the idea that 
fiction can be defined by the creator’s mandate to imagine the story contents. 
For fictions mandate that we imagine, as well as believe, various things are so 
in the story world. For example, a viewer of Nowhere in Africa (2002, Caroline 
Link) is mandated to imagine various things, such as that Walter and Jettel 
Redlick are a Jewish couple that is forced to relocate from Nazi Germany in 
1938 to a farm in Kenya. However, the director intends that we also believe 
various things, for instance, that Kenya is in Africa.
Is it possible for the Imagination Account of Fiction to account for the fact 
that there are truths in fiction we are mandated to believe as well as imagine? 
In a very recent book-length treatment of imagination and fiction, Kathleen 
Stock suggests that it can. She defends what she calls “extreme intentionalism,” 
the view that the fictional content of a work is what the author intended the 
reader to imagine (Stock 2017). In response to Matravers, she argues that the 
total content of a fiction is stored in the mind of the reader and then marked as 















































so in the story, the reader indexes these truths as beliefs. Thus, Stock responds 
that the Imagination Account can acknowledge that an author intends that 
some of a work’s contents are to be believed and not just imagined (Stock 
2017: 168).
Noël Carroll explains how this type of mental compartmentalization might 
work. The default assumption is that what is true in the fiction is what the film-
maker mandates that the viewer imagine. However, as we work to comprehend 
the story’s narrative, depending on the film, we might then “suspend” the 
mandate to imagine various things as so in favor of a mandate to believe these 
things instead (Carroll 2016: 124). For example, as we comprehend the story 
in Gone With the Wind (1939, Fleming), we imagine the author mandates us to 
believe that certain things are so in the life of Scarlett O’Hara, but then come 
to understand that we need to believe various things (for instance, that Atlanta 
is in Georgia) (Carroll 2016: 124). We might say that in Carroll’s view, as we 
engage with a work of fiction, we go through a process of “reflective equilib-
rium” in which we measure hypotheses about what goes in the story against 
the evidence that is presented in the story figure out what we are mandated to 
imagine versus what we are mandated to believe. To be sure, more could be 
said about how this happens, as Carroll acknowledges. But in principle, we see 
how a response to Matraver’s objection to the Imagination Account of 
Fiction works.
Carroll’s reply to Matravers also has implications for another point that 
often comes up in the discussion of the Ontological Gap Argument. For in 
defending the argument, Levinson seems to make use of what is known as the 
Assertion Argument.11 According to this view, movie narration works the way 
in which some think that narration in literary fiction works. Literary works 
employ declarative sentences to report the goings on of characters and events 
in the story, as does the first sentence of Harry Potter and the Chamber of 
Secrets “Not for the first time, an argument had broken out over breakfast at 
number four Privet Drive.” Declarative sentences make utterances or asser-
tions, and it is natural, the argument goes, for the reader to imagine that where 
there is an assertion, there is an asserter, the implicit narrator of the story.12
George Wilson builds on the Assertion Argument to argue that we need 
implicit narrators in literature for the reader to understand what is true in the 
fiction versus what is just supposition (Wilson 2007: 82–83). If, to use a ver-
sion of Wilson’s example, “Katie loves Hubble. Many people thought this was 
true. But was is so?” there is a question if we are supposed to take “Katie loves 
Hubble” as something we imagine is true in the story versus something we are 
just supposed to consider as a possibility. Wilson’s idea is that to figure out that 
“Katie loves Hubble” is true in the story, we need to determine whether we 
should imagine a fictional, implicit narrator is “asserting” that this is so.
11 Carroll (2006: 197), Thomson-Jones (2009: 299); see also Matravers (2014: 123).
12 Walton (1990: 265), Matravers (2014: 122).
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However, we can see how Carroll and others might reply that no such imag-
ining of a fictional narrator is necessary. The reader faces a choice of taking 
“Katie loves Hubble” as true in the fiction versus something she is simply sup-
posed to wonder about or entertain as a possibility. Her task then is to deter-
mine whether the author mandates her to imagine that “Katie loves Hubble” 
is true in the story or whether “Katie loves Hubble” is something she should 
just consider as a possibility in the story. To determine the author’s intentions, 
she asks which hypothesis makes the most sense of the narrative as a whole. No 
fictional narrator is needed. Wilson replies that while it is possible to figure out 
what is true in the story without imagining a narrator asserting it to be so, it is 
“extremely strained and artificial” to not have an implied narrator be the way 
one ascertains the truth in a fiction (Wilson 2011: 120).
 Conclusion: Where Do Things Then Stand with the Ontological Gap 
Argument?
To accept it, we must make several assumptions about viewer’s experience at 
the movies. First, viewers at the movies imagine they are receiving a report 
from inside the story world; second, that to comprehend what is true in the 
fiction, we need to imagine a fictional presenter asserting or reporting that 
things are so in the story world. Implicit narrator skeptics call both these 
assumptions into question. Instead, they propose the Imagination Account of 
Fiction: that we can comprehend what is true in the story by what the author 
mandates us to imagine. The Imagination Account faces some challenges, spe-
cifically the fact that sometimes we are mandated to not imagine things are so 
in the story world, but also believe them. This is a challenge that proponents 
of the Imagination Account acknowledge they have to meet. But they maintain 
that there is ample motivation to do so. There is simply no evidence that the 
“plain viewer” at the movies imagines herself to access the story events through 
the mediation of a fictional narrator (Carroll 2016: 126).
As noted, in Part I, some suggest that the reasons for thinking there are 
implicit narrators in literature also support narrators in movies. However, nov-
els convey a story with words, while the use of images is central to storytelling 
in films. In the next section, we look at George Wilson’s formidable argument, 
which takes into account the nature of cinematic narration as visual storytelling.
Part IV: The Imagined Seeing Thesis
 Imagined Seeing at the Movies
Like Levinson, Wilson is interested in how audiences at the cinema say that, in 
some sense, they “see” or make perceptual contact with the fictional events and 
characters in the drama.13 Wilson acknowledges that the audience does not 
13 Wilson (2011: 7). Wilson is inspired by a fascinating discussion of visualization at the theater 








































literally see the characters in the narrative story, yet he wants to take seriously 
their talk of “seeing” the characters in the story.
To do so, Wilson argues for a distinctive thesis regarding movie narration: 
the Imagined Seeing Thesis, the view that movie narratives work on viewers by 
prompting them to imagine that they see the characters and events in the story, 
or “imagine seeing” for short.
There are many questions that philosophers raise about the Imagined Seeing 
Thesis. One basic question is: just what is imagined seeing? Is it just a manner 
of speaking? Should the phenomenon Wilson calls “imagined seeing” be ana-
lyzed or reduced to other sorts of imagining? For instance, perceptual imagin-
ing, which is counterfactually dependent on perception (Currie 1990: 181–185) 
or “seeing-in,” where one imagines one thing (a photographic image of Cary 
Grant) as another (an image of Roger Thornhill).14 Is the Imagined Seeing 
Thesis an empirical claim about how viewers, in fact, engage, with movies? 
(Stecker 2013: 153). If so, what is the empirical evidence in support of it?
Imagined seeing is often differentiated from impersonal imagining, or imag-
ining that certain things are so in the fiction, for example, that Harry Potter is 
a student at Hogwarts, the school for wizards.15 In contrast, imagined seeing is 
a form of personal imagining, for I place myself into the content of what I 
imagine, for instance, I imagine that I see Dorothy and Toto arriving in the 
land of Oz.16 Imagined seeing is thought to be a kind of experiential imagining 
because when a visual representation induces imagined seeing in the viewer, it 
is said to induce an experience one thinks of as “as if” one were actually seeing 
the events and characters in the fiction (Wilson 2011: 73, 2013: 167).
Talk of imagined seeing gives Wilson a distinctive way to argue for his ver-
sion of the implicit cinematic narrator, a “minimal narrating agency” (Wilson 
2011: 112). This minimal narrating agency has no personal characteristics; its 
only function is to show the story events to the audience. Thus, Noël Carroll 
has dubbed this argument the “Seeing/Showing” Argument for the implicit 
cinematic narrator (Carroll 2016).
The Seeing/Showing Argument:
 1. Movie narration works on the audience by standardly prompting them to 
imagine that they see the story events from the fictional world.
 2. If (1), then standardly, in all fiction films, there must be a fictional pre-
senter, an implicit, minimal narrating agency that shows the audience the 
events from the world of the fiction.
14 For discussions of seeing in, see Wolheim (1998: 217–238), Hopkins (2008, 2016), and 
Stecker (2013). For a response to Wolheim that imagined seeing should not be understood in 
terms of seeing in, see Walton (2002).
15 Some philosophers, such as Noël Carroll, Colin McGinn, and Greg Currie maintain that imag-
ining at the movies is standardly impersonal imagining. See Carroll (1995: 98–99, 2006, 2016), 
Currie (1991, 1995a, b), and McGinn (2005) and Gaut (1998: 333–334, 2010: 217).
16 For personal versus impersonal imaginings, see Currie (1990: 181–185).
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 3. Therefore, standardly, in all fiction films, there is a minimal narrating 
agency that shows the audience the events from the world of the fiction.
 4. If the Seeing/Showing Argument is correct, then, standardly, in every 
fiction film there are implicit “narrating agencies” that mediate our access 
to the story worlds and the claim that every fiction film has an implicit 
narrator is confirmed. But how sound is the argument?
 The Imagined Seeing Thesis: How to Formulate It?
The Imagined Seeing Thesis needs to be refined, as Wilson recognizes, because 
there are some puzzling questions that arise when we try to take seriously view-
ers talk that they imagine seeing the events and characters from the fiction.
The problem with imagined seeing arises from the following claims: if the 
audience imagines that they are seeing the story events, then they imagine see-
ing them from a series of definite visual perspectives. If they imagine seeing 
from a visual perspective, then they also imagine that they see from a vantage 
point that is within the story world. This would be the account of the IST that 
George Wilson calls “Face-to-Face-Imagined Seeing”:
Face-to-Face Imagined Seeing Thesis:
When the audience watches a fiction film, they are prompted to imagine that they 
are seeing the story events by standing face-to-face with them (Wilson 2011: 36).
But Face-to-Face Imagined Seeing gives rise to a host of perplexing questions. 
Is it plausible to think that as we watch Christopher Nolan’s Dunkirk (2017), 
for example, we are mandated to imagine that we are there on the beach at 
Dunkirk as bullets fly and the Allied Forces are rained down with bullets?17 
What do we then imagine about how we are able to dodge bullets? And when 
we imagine seeing a murder in the story that is stipulated to be unseen, doesn’t 
that involve us in engaging in contradictory imaginings, that (a) we imagine 
that it is true that the murder is unseen and (b) we imagine seeing the murder 
(Currie 1995a, b; Carroll 1995, 2005, 2016; Gaut 2010)?
Wilson rejects Face-to-Face Imagined Seeing because he does not think it is 
true to the viewer’s experience. It is not part of our engagement with a movie 
that we imagine ourselves located within the story space, at the viewpoint 
implied by the vantage point of the motion picture shot.
So Wilson instead favors this version of imagined seeing:
Mediated Imagined Seeing:
The audience imagines that they see a recording of the events in the story world 
that has been photographically derived in some undetermined way (Wilson 
2011: 89).
17 But see Thomson-Jones (2012), who argues that some films prompt the audience to imagine 







































According to Mediated Imagined Seeing, the audience imagines that they see 
the story events, indirectly, through seeing a motion-picture-like recording of 
them. Just how this recording is obtained is not part of what the audience 
needs to imagine (Wilson 2011: 89–91).
Wilson has a battery of arguments in favor of Mediated Imagined Seeing. His 
most central point is that Mediated Imagined Seeing is the best way to explain 
the way that aspects of cinematic construction such as color, grain, focus, cam-
era angle, and editing mediate the audience’s imagined seeing of the characters 
and action. For example, when the viewer sees the action jump quickly from 
one time and place to the next, as happens in the final shots of North By 
Northwest, what does the viewer imagine is going on? According to Mediated 
Imagined Seeing, she does not explain this as the actual filmmaker’s decision to 
move the action by having a rapid cut. Instead, the viewer imagines that there 
is some editing going on at the level of the fiction, through the action of the 
implicit, minimal narrating agency.
One worry is that, like its cousin, Mediated Imagined Seeing, is open to the 
objection that it gives rise to absurd imaginings (Gaut 2004: 242; Carroll 
2006: 179–180). For if the viewer imagines she is watching motion picture 
shots of actual events, then she will need to imagine the implications of this, 
and embarrassing questions follow such as how is the fictional narrator able to 
record the incidents and go unnoticed? How can there be a recording of a 
story, such as The Ten Commandments (Demille, 1956) that takes place in 
B.C.E., before the invention of the camera?
Wilson is aware of these objections and says that we may imagine that we are 
watching segments of the story world via “naturally iconic shots,” shots that 
are causally dependent on the scene but need not be produced by a camera. So, 
imagining the presence of a camera or other recording device need not be part 
of what it is that the audience imagines (Wilson 1997: 113, 2011: 48).
Thus, the burden of Wilson’s reply to the concern about absurd imagining 
is that viewers can imagine things without having to imagine the implications 
of what they are imagining (Wilson 2013: 161). Wilson supports this claim he 
derives from some work by Kendall Walton (Walton 1990: 174–182). Walton’s 
idea is that there are questions about fictions whose answers are not specified 
and so these questions are “silly,” pointless, and inappropriate to ask.
Wilson takes up Walton’s idea and illustrates it with the example from Flash 
Gordon in the old black and white science fiction serials (1936). In the story, 
we suppose that Flash Gordon has a viewing machine that enables him to see 
anywhere in the universe, but such a device violates the laws of physics, as we 
know them. Wilson maintains that it is a silly question for the viewer to imagine 
how such a device works, for this is indeterminate or not specified in the Flash 
Gordon stories (Wilson 1997: 314–315). The same is true if viewers had to 
imagine the implications of imagining they are watching a recording of actual 
events. With this move, Wilson tries to fend off the absurd imaginings objec-
tion by saying that questions about how the recording of events comes about 
are silly ones to ask.














































In reply, critics such as Berys Gaut and Noël Carroll insist that what is known 
as the “Realistic Heuristic” governs our imaginings about fiction. Their idea is 
that when we engage with a work of fiction, we “fill in” and draw implications 
from what is explicitly true in the fiction based on how things are in the real 
world, unless it is explicitly stipulated to be otherwise.18In the Flash Gordon 
serials, the story makes explicit that the screening devices work as shown. So, 
we go along with this feature of Flash’s screen, just as we go along with the 
idea, in other stories, that there are wizards that can perform magic, there are 
zombies that are dead and alive, and so on (Carroll 2006: 181).
In short, critics charge that Wilson’s defense rests on a misleading analogy 
(Carroll 2006: 181). Because Flash’s screening device is explicitly introduced 
to work as represented, we do not take issue with it. We suspend “default real-
ism” and do not expend energy worrying about it. However, no one clues us 
into the implicit narrator: it is, after all, an implicit feature of the narration, not 
explicit. So, we cannot fend off worries about how the cinematic operator with 
the thought “just accept the filmmaker says this is how things work” (Carroll 
2006: 125). Because there is not, in other words, an exceptions clause for the 
cinematic narrator, the Realistic Heuristic licenses us to imaginatively fill in the 
implications of its presence in the story world (Carroll 2006: 181).
Thus, the debate between Wilson and his critics concerns whether the ques-
tions that critics ask about the operation of Wilson’s version of the implicit 
cinematic narrator are “silly” ones to ask. This is the question we examine in 
the next section.
Part V: Reconsidering the Objection from Absurd Imaginings
To review, by far, the most serious objection that friends of the implicit cine-
matic narrator face is the concern about absurd imaginings. This question dogs 
all versions of the cinematic narrator we have discussed. In response to this 
problem, Chatman maintained that questions about how the narrator comes to 
have its knowledge are “non-questions” (Chatman 1990: 130). Levinson had 
to fend off Kania’s concern that it is not possible to say a fictional narrator is 
our guide to the story’s sights and sounds without embarrassing questions 
about the narrator following. Also, Wilson faces the objection that his Mediating 
Imagined Seeing thesis cannot avoid the sort of absurdities that have plagued 
other formulations of imagined seeing. The question we must now, then, try to 
sort out is whether the critics’ questions about the cinematic narrator are legiti-
mate ones to ask.
Concerns about improbabilities in works of fiction go back to Aristotle’s 
Poetics, where he said that ideally there should be no improbabilities in the plot 
(Poetics 1460b27). Drama is an imitation of human action and life. Dramas 
that have improbable incidents, especially in the plot, undermine the sense that 
goings on in the drama work as they do in real life. For things in real life obey 











































cause and effect, and the audience’s emotional response to the story depends 
on their making a connection between the fiction and everyday life. Thus, plays 
that build to a narrative resolution by having a deus ex machina solution, such 
as Medea improbably spirited away in a chariot at the last minute, are to be 
avoided, unless there is some overriding reason to include them (Poetics 
15.1454a37). Also, when the poet must include them, to achieve a certain 
effect, the artist should find ways to de-emphasize them, for instance, by 
including them in the “backstory” of the larger story world from which the 
play draws, and not as part of the events that are dramatized in front of the 
audience on the stage (Poetics 15.1454b5-7).
Kendall Walton voices similar ideas when he advances the “Reality Principle” 
(Walton 1990:144–151). To comprehend and appreciate the story, we must 
“fill in: a great deal of information that is not explicitly represented.19 The 
Reality Principle directs an appreciator of fiction to “fill in” or infer from what 
is explicitly presented in the fiction, based on the idea that the fictional world 
operates as the real world does. So, for example, to appreciate the Harry Potter 
stories and movies, we have to infer things that the novel does not explicitly 
introduce: even though Harry is a wizard and can perform magic, in every 
other relevant respect, Harry is like ordinary “muggles”—he is not immortal, 
has parents, and so on. Thus, Walton’s “Reality Principle” is very much like 
Carroll and Gaut’s “Realistic Heuristic.”
One might say that, in general, the Realistic Heuristic, the idea that we fill 
what is true in the fiction according to how things work in real life, is sound. 
For an important, if not universally accepted, way of thinking about fiction is 
that it is capable of affecting a change in the audience’s view of themselves and 
the world.20 To do so, works of fiction must present representations of human 
action that are broadly realistic and true to life, unless things are specified oth-
erwise in the story (for instance, Flash Gordon’s viewing screen or magic in the 
world of Harry Potter).
Further, there is an important practical reason for assuming that the Reality 
Principle holds. It is just not possible for an author or filmmaker to fill out 
everything that is true in the story world she creates for the reader or viewer. 
To do so would run the risk of distracting from the appreciation of what is 
essential and relevant to know and what is not. Instead, with the Reality 
Principle, the creator of the fiction can leave certain fictional truths implicit, 
and we use how things work in the real world to fill in information about the 
story world. When the story world departs from the real world, this exception 
can be explicitly introduced. So, the Reality Principle provides a practical way 
for the appreciator of a fictional work to “fill out” the story world, without 
leaving the contents of the story world mostly unspecified (Gaut 2004: 245).
19 The problem of just what an appreciator of fiction “fills in” as she comprehends a story is a 
subject of great debate. See, for example, Lewis (1978), Beardsley (1981: 242–247), Walton 
(1990: 144–161), Lamarque (1990), and Lorand (2001).
20 Catherine Wilson (2004), Elisabeth Schellenkens (2007).
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In response, Wilson is likely to insist that there are paradoxes and inconsis-
tencies at the base of many fictional narratives. A prime example that Wilson 
gives comes from the Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. It is fictional that Huck, 
a barely literate young man who goes stir crazy when he sits for too long, wrote 
the 300-page memoir about his adventures (Wilson 1997: 309). If we ask how 
this could be, we would get tangled up in imagining absurd scenarios that dis-
tract from our proper appreciation of the story. Wilson suggests we are just not 
meant to imagine the implications of how such a narrative feat is possible, and 
so the Realistic Heuristic is blocked. We need not imagine all the implications 
of how Huck could have crafted the tale. In other words, we should not expend 
energy worrying about the embarrassing questions about the cinematic narra-
tor/fictional shower because they have no answer within the world of the story, 
and so they are silly questions to ask (Wilson 1997: 308–9; Wilson 2011: 48).
It might appear that we have arrived at a stalemate or impasse between phi-
losophers on both sides of the debate. However, we might make headway by 
looking more closely at some of the examples that are often given of silly ques-
tions to ask. If these paradigm examples are like, in relevant respects, questions 
one might ask about the cinematic narrator, then Wilson’s argument might be 
plausible. On the other hand, if the agreed upon examples are not sufficiently 
like asking questions about the cinematic narrator, then we might have some 
reason for thinking that Wilson’s response to his critics is not plausible.
Centrally, the silly questions that Walton considers to be inappropriate are 
so because it is wrong to seek an answer in the world of the fiction. Instead, we 
find the answer outside the story world, by considering the generic conven-
tions that govern the art form in question. For example, the audience at the 
opera does not ask why it is that the characters in opera often spend their last 
moments singing, while they are passing away in excruciating pain! (Walton 
1990: 177). Only someone who was ignorant of the conventions of opera, as a 
particular art form, would ask this question. Further, it is fictional in the play, 
The Belle of Amherst, that the character, Emily Dickinson, is shy and retiring, a 
person of few words. However, the actor who impersonates Dickinson has 
many lines and commands the attention of the audience (Walton 1990: 176). 
It is silly or inappropriate to ask why a quiet person is talking so much and 
expect the answer to be found within the terms of the story. The conventions 
and nature of a play of this sort require that the character talk a lot to convey 
the poet’s thoughts and feelings.
In these types of cases, as Greg Currie notes, there is no one-to-one corre-
spondence between the features of the representation, for instance, of Othello 
and the features that Othello has in the story world (Currie 2010: 59). That is, 
a well-informed spectator of theater understands that the poetic speeches that 
Othello offers, for example, do not reflect a quality in the character of Othello, 
but are there instead to stir the emotions with the beauty and eloquence of the 
quality of the language. As Currie puts it, “While the words uttered by the 
actor constitute great poetry, they are not represented as representing great 















































Generalizing from these examples, we can explain why the questions one 
could raise in these cases are inappropriate ones to ask. A question is a silly one, 
in these cases, to ask, provided the answer is not found within the terms of the 
fiction but instead is explained by the nature of the genre of the artwork and its 
associated conventions.
We can also see how accepting that these cases involve silly questions is com-
patible with holding our imaginings about fiction are, in general, governed by 
the Realistic Heuristic. It is not given as true in the fiction that Othello is a fine 
poet or speechmaker: this is a feature of how Othello is represented due to the 
artistic requirements of Shakespeare’s plays. As such, we are not mandated to 
imagine the implications for what is true in the story world when Othello 
makes a beautiful speech. Similarly, we are not required to infer what follows 
from imagining that barely literate Huck Finn authors a 300-page memoir. We 
understand it is Mark Twain’s words that are the source of the fictional mem-
oir, not Huck Finn’s, because fictional narratives have to be crafted by actual 
authors. So, we understand that we do not need to infer what follows for the 
story world if we imagine that we are reading a lengthy fictional memoir that 
Huck pens.
Now what follows for the debate between Wilson and his critics over the 
absurd imaginings? Recall that on Wilson’s Mediated Imagined Seeing thesis, 
when we watch a movie, we are to imagine that we are watching a recording of 
the story events taken from within the fictional world. Critics ask, how was 
such a recording made? How could there be a recording of events if the story 
is set in a time before the camera was invented? And, further, if we suppose that 
some naturally occurring camera is the source of the shots we are seeing, what 
are we to imagine about point-of-view shots? How can naturally occurring 
cameras get inside people’s heads? Are the questions that his critics pose silly 
ones to ask?
Recall that according to Wilson’s Mediated Imagined Seeing, we are to 
imagine that it is true in the story world that such a recording was made. For 
recalling the Ontological Gap Argument, the narrator or narrating device has 
to be imagined to be part of the fictional world in order for us to imagine that 
what we are seeing is a recording taking place from within the story world. The 
objection then is that once we imagine a recording takes place in the world of 
the fiction, we must imagine what follows from this, in accordance with the 
Realistic Heuristic. But when imagine what follows from the presence of a 
recording of the story events, absurd imaginings follow.
Wilson insists that to seek answers to these questions is inappropriate. But 
our examination of some central cases of silly question pertaining to fiction 
suggests that the questions about how the recording comes about are legiti-
mate ones to ask. For we said that there is no reason to think that it is true in 
the fiction that Huck is a literate or capable of sitting still long enough to write 
a 300-page memoir. And there is no reason to think it is true in the fiction that 
Othello, a brash man of action, makes beautiful speeches, and so on with the 
other examples we looked at. But Wilson would have us imagine that it is true 
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in the fiction that there is a recording of the story events or fictional facts. This 
means, as Wilson’s critics charge, that once we suppose that the implicit narra-
tor (or minimal narrating agency) is part of the fictional world, it is reasonable 
to fill in the implications of its presence there. And when we do, we get tangled 
up in the embarrassing questions about the cinematic narrator that we have 
rehearsed in this section.21
Conclusion: Further Issues for Cinematic Narration
If we are skeptics about imagined seeing as the way movies work on us as view-
ers, is there another way to explain the phenomena to which Wilson’s work 
draws our attention? For Wilson is insistent that any account of how movie 
narratives engage our imagination will need to address the way in which view-
ers at the movies describe their experiences as that it is “as if ” they are seeing 
segments of the story world. A concern with explaining the impression that we 
are making perceptual contact with the story world also clearly motivates 
Levinson’s Ontological Gap Argument. But explaining our engagement with 
movies in terms of imagined perceptual relations faces problems, as we have 
seen. How might we undertake to explain how film as a distinctively visual 
form of storytelling works on us, the viewers?
Greg Currie proposes that we distinguish visual fictions from nonvisual fic-
tion by how film narration determines or conveys the story content. Currie 
uses the term “perceptual imagining” to mark out the distinctive kind of imag-
ining movies prompt in viewers (Currie 1991: 140, 1995a, b: Chapter 6). 
When a viewer watches a movie, it is the viewer’s actual perception of a visual 
image that prompts her imagining the story’s contents. In visual fictions, the 
viewer’s imagining of story events is then counterfactually dependent on look-
ing at images.22
Noël Carroll discusses the distinct perceptual and cognitive faculties that 
movie narration engages, as a form of pictorial comprehension (Carroll 2008: 
108–115). Movies present familiar scenes and characters even if they are ones 
the filmmaker makes up. Thus, movies mobilize the same capacity for object 
recognition that we employ in everyday life. Therefore, one might say that the 
“Recognition Prompt” view can explain why viewers report that their experi-
ence is “as if” they see the characters in real life, without positing they stand in 
an imagined perceptual relation to them. What they are reporting is a sense of 
recognition of something previously encountered in perception, not an imag-
ined seeing of them.
A further possibility is to hold that the notion that viewers at the movies 
look at the moving pictures on the screen and “see in” to them the characters 
21 See also Curran (2016: 103–106).
22 Wilson remains open to the possibility that what he means by “imagined seeing” at the movies 
is what Currie means by perceptual imagining. See Wilson (2011: 75–76). Currie revisits his views 








































and situations that the image depicts (Wollhein 2008: 217–238; Hopkins 
2008, 2016). Seeing in is not an imagined seeing of characters but a seeing in 
which one thing (a movie shot of Ingrid Bergman) is taken as a representation 
of another (Ilsa Lund). The virtue of “seeing-in” is that it can account for the 
role that perception plays in imagining story content, while also being able to 
explain how the viewer can appreciate the properties of the moving shot as an 
image or representation (Stecker 2013: 153–4).23
COnClusiOn
Cinematic narration is the way in which movies tell their stories to an audience. 
The overall question we have looked at here is how do movies work on us so 
that we come to imagine the story events? There are two broad areas of con-
tention. The first concerns whether to comprehend what is true in the story—
we need to imagine a fictional presenter who reports or shows that things are 
so in the story. Alternatively, is the Imagination Account of Fiction right that 
we comprehend the story in virtue of the actual filmmaker’s mandate to imag-
ine things are thus and so in the story? The second concerns whether audiences 
at the movies standardly imagine seeing the characters and story events. Or do 
we instead imagine that certain things are so in the story world, without imag-
ining we are seeing these incidents?
We have seen that the issue of how we imaginatively “fill in” the implications 
of what is explicitly the case in the fiction is central to resolving both issues. An 
exciting line of further inquiry is whether the Imagination Account of Fiction 
can offer a complete answer to how viewers comprehend a story. If the argu-
ment in this chapter is correct, there is sufficient reason to hope it can do so.
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